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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE CHALLENGE OF ACHIEVING DISCOVERY FROM THIRD
PARTY, NON-RETAINED EXPERTS

INTRODUCTION
There is an almost natural tension between science and litigation, arising
from the inherent unpleasantness scientists must endure because of the
demands of litigation. 1 Tensions between litigation and science can become
particularly severe when discovery is directed at a non-party, non-retained
expert, scientist, or researcher. 2
Consider the following hypothetical: during products liability litigation, the
plaintiff’s expert takes the stand and testifies the defendant’s product caused
the plaintiff’s injury. When asked to describe the basis for his opinion, the
plaintiff’s expert explains how he formed his opinion by relying upon a paper
published by an independent researcher. The results of the research paper
explain how the defendant’s product causes the same type of injury suffered by
the plaintiff. On cross-examination, the defense tries to impeach the
foundational underpinnings of the expert’s testimony by attacking the merits of
the research paper the expert relied upon. However, since the expert only
analyzed the research paper, the defendant’s attorney is unable to identify any
flaws in the underlying data supporting the independent researcher’s
conclusions in the paper. Therefore, the defendant is forced to accept the
research presented as correct and it can be relied upon in the current litigation.
The jury, accepting the expert’s conclusions and reasoning, awards millions of
dollars to the plaintiff.
This hypothetical highlights the need for the defendant’s attorney to
acquire the information used by the independent researcher. Because the expert
relied heavily on the independent researcher’s paper when forming an expert
opinion, the defense can challenge the expert’s opinion by disputing the
research paper upon which the expert relied. In order to determine if there is a
basis to dispute the research paper, the defendant needs the underlying data the
independent researcher used to support the research paper. Once the defense
obtains the underlying information, the information can be provided to their
own experts to determine if and how the research paper’s conclusions are

1. Richard L. Marcus, Discovery Along the Litigation/Science Interface, 57 BROOK. L.
REV. 381, 382, 384 (1991) (commenting on the suspicion of litigation in the scientific
community).
2. Id. at 394.
573
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challengeable. But first, in order to obtain the independent researcher’s
information, a subpoena must be issued to compel the independent researcher
to turn over the information because the independent researcher is not a party,
nor a retained expert to a party. 3
Part I of this paper explains why the general rules regarding experts do not
address this situation and then discusses a court decision in which the court
was faced with a researcher in this situation. Part II discusses the 1991
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a line of three cases that
show the need for the rule and how, after twenty-five years, the amendments
have not changed how the courts address this problem. Part III discusses the
different arguments, both successful and unsuccessful, researchers have made
to try to resist discovery, both inside and outside the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Finally, Part IV discusses the researcher scholar’s privilege and
what other changes can be made to better help and protect researchers.
I. WHY THE EXPERT DISCOVERY RULES FAIL
The goal in the hypothetical described above is for the corporation’s
attorney to gain discovery from the independent researcher in order to
determine if there is a basis to question the opinions of the expert witness.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 provides the general rule regarding
discovery 4 and the specific rules regarding discovery from expert witnesses. 5
The expert witness, who was specifically retained by the plaintiff for trial, will
have to disclose all the facts and data he considered when forming his expert
opinion. 6 This disclosure will include the independent researcher’s report,
since it helped form the expert’s opinion. However, since the expert witness
never considered, viewed, or analyzed the underlying data supporting the
independent researcher’s report, the expert witness cannot disclose that
information. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure only require the disclosure
of all information considered by the expert. 7 Further, the expert witness is
physically incapable of turning over this information because the information
has never been in the possession of the expert. Remember, while the expert has
never seen this underlying information, the information is still critical to the
expert’s opinion because it was used by the independent researcher in
developing the report upon which the expert relied.

3. FED. R. CIV. P. 45.
4. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1).
5. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2).
6. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(B)(ii). Disclosure must be accompanied by a written report if
the witness is one retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony in the case. FED. R.
CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(B). The report must contain the facts or data considered by the witness when
forming the witness’s opinions. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(B)(ii).
7. Id.
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Additionally, the corporation’s attorney cannot obtain discovery from the
independent researcher using Rule 26. Under Rule 26, discovery is only
available from experts who may testify at trial as witnesses. 8 Rule 26
disclosure from experts does not extend to an expert who has not consented to
participate in the lawsuit because the rule only applies to facts and opinions
held by experts acquired or developed in anticipation of litigation. 9 The
independent researcher is not an expert witness retained by the plaintiff or
otherwise expected to testify. In fact, the independent researcher is not a
witness because the researcher’s only connection to the case is the researcher’s
report being used at trial by the expert witness. Thus, the independent
researcher is a third party to the litigation, and a subpoena is required to
compel the production of the underlying data in the possession of the
independent researcher. 10
However, what happens when the independent researcher refuses to
provide the information and challenges the subpoena? What happens if the
researcher refuses to become an expert witness to either party and therefore is
not subject to the required expert disclosure? After all, most scientists would
prefer to not suffer the demands of litigation and instead keep their distance. 11
Can the party compel the independent researcher to turn over their
information? Does the party’s need for the information override the fact that
the subpoenaed researcher is a non-party and has no direct connection to the
current litigation at hand?
A.

Deitchman v. E.R. Squibb & Sons

The hypothetical situation discussed above is grounded in numerous real
world examples where parties sought the underlying information supporting an
independent researcher’s published research. 12 One particularly illustrative

8. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(B) (applying to a witness giving expert testimony); FED. R. CIV.
P. 26(a)(2)(C) (applying to witnesses giving testimony).
9. In re Snyder, 115 F.R.D. 211, 214–15 (D. Ariz. 1987).
10. FED. R. CIV. P. 45(a).
11. Marcus, supra note 1, at 387.
12. Farnsworth v. Procter & Gamble Co., 758 F.2d 1545, 1546 (11th Cir. 1985) (discussing
a research center challenging a subpoena seeking the personal information regarding the
participants used in the center’s Toxic Shock Syndrome study suggesting the syndrome can be
caused by a specific type of tampon); In re Am. Tobacco Co., 880 F.2d 1520, 1522 (2d Cir. 1989)
(discussing tobacco companies seeking to compel the underlying data of two studies published by
a non-party doctor suggesting a person exposed to both tobacco smoke and asbestos have a much
higher likelihood of developing cancer); In re Snyder, 115 F.R.D. at 211–12 (discussing a car
manufacturer seeking information from an author of a study suggesting certain vehicles are more
hazardous than others).
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example is Deitchman v. E.R. Squibb & Sons. 13 Deitchman brought a
pharmaceutical products liability action against E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. and
other drug companies for a disease caused by exposure to the drug
diethylstilbestrol (DES). 14 In connection with the litigation, Squibb issued a
subpoena for the production of every document in the Registry for Hormonal
Transplacental Carcinogenesis at the University of Chicago, maintained by Dr.
Arthur Herbst. 15 This registry maintained records on the exact aspects of the
plaintiff’s disease, a type of cancer called adenocarcinoma. 16 Dr. Herbst tried
to quash the subpoena claiming the information sought was confidential and
privileged. 17
Dr. Herbst was not a party to the case and would not testify at the trial. 18
His only connection to the case was the publication of a study suggesting an
association between exposure to the drug DES and the cancer from which the
plaintiff suffered. 19 Dr. Herbst created the registry to determine what caused
this particular kind of cancer and the best means for treatment. 20 In order to
establish the registry, Dr. Herbst requested medical records of women with this
type of cancer, with his promise to keep the information confidential, from
medical schools and hospitals throughout the world. 21 Dr. Herbst made these
requests annually, to continually update the registry’s information and gather
more information regarding this type of cancer. 22
The court, adopting a balancing standard used to assess disclosure of
materials between parties, held that when protection from a subpoena is
sought, the court must employ a balancing test to determine whether the need
of the party seeking disclosure outweighs the adverse effect such disclosure
would have on the policies underlying the claimed privilege. 23 In this context,
the court said the nature of Dr. Herbst’s and Squibb’s competing hardships
must be compared. 24

13. Deitchman v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 740 F.2d 556, 558 (7th Cir. 1984) (discussing
drug companies seeking information from a study suggesting an association between cancer and
the drug diethylstilbestrol).
14. Id. at 557.
15. Id. at 558.
16. Id. at 557–58.
17. Id. at 558.
18. Deitchman, 740 F.2d at 558.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 558–59.
22. Id. at 559.
23. Deitchman, 740 F.2d at 559 (quoting EEOC v. Univ. of Notre Dame du Lac, 715 F.2d
331, 338 (7th Cir. 1983) (addressing the disclosure of materials between parties)).
24. Id.
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Dr. Herbst argued how disclosing the information would destroy his ability
to continue the registry. 25 Dr. Herbst provided several affidavits from doctors
who had provided the registry with information on the condition of
confidentiality and would stop providing information if the confidentiality
could be breached because of a subpoena. 26 Further, Dr. Herbst explained the
importance of keeping the research confidential, the significance of his
research, and the necessity for the registry to continue in order to further
research this form of cancer. 27 Finally, even Squibb conceded that the loss of
confidentiality would adversely affect Dr. Herbst and the registry. 28
Squibb claims its hardship would be its inability to adequately defend itself
at trial. 29 The plaintiff’s experts universally and repeatedly relied upon Dr.
Herbst’s published articles to show the relationship between DES exposure and
subsequent injuries in order to show causation. 30 Without the underlying
registry data upon which Dr. Herbst’s conclusions are based, Squibb argued it
was unable to defend the issue of causation adequately. 31 Neither party
disputed that Dr. Herbst’s articles would be used against Squibb, and Squibb
needed access to the underlying data to prepare its defense. 32 Allowing access
to the underlying data supporting Dr. Herbst’s findings would allow Squibb to
critically scrutinize the credibility, accuracy, and validity of Dr. Herbst’s
statistics and conclusions. 33
The court acknowledged this unique situation resulted in Squibb facing Dr.
Herbst as a potential expert witness without him ever taking the stand or being
subject to cross-examination. 34 Any expert called upon to refute Dr. Herbst’s
claims could be easily dismissed because he or she would not have viewed the
collective information contained within the registry, unlike Dr. Herbst, 35 since
the registry is the sole source of information concerning the association
between DES and this particular form of cancer. 36 Thus, any denial of
discovery would preclude Squibb from engaging in any meaningful crossexamination of plaintiff’s experts’ opinions, based almost exclusively on Dr.
Herbst’s articles. 37

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id.
Id. at 560.
Id.
Deitchman, 740 F.2d at 560.
Id. at 561.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Deitchman, 740 F.2d at 562.
Id. at 561.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 562.
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The court concluded that for Squibb to properly defend the issue of
causation, access to the registry’s underlying data to analyze its accuracy and
methodology is absolutely essential. 38 The court recognized the problem of
confidentiality but also noted it was easily cured by simply expanding
protection a little beyond the usual deletion of patient names. 39 The court
explained when it is confronted with a motion to quash a subpoena, its duty is
not to deny any discovery, but to reduce the demand to what is reasonable,
considering the discoverer’s needs and the discoveree’s problems. 40 The court
reasoned to give Squibb nothing would be an abuse of discretion and ordered
the modification of the subpoena to protect the confidentiality of the registry’s
information while giving Squibb discoverable information at its sole
expense. 41
II. 1991 AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Deitchman was decided in 1984 42 and was just one case representing the
growing trend of the use of subpoenas to compel the giving of evidence and
information by unretained experts. 43 To address this trend, Rule 45 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure regarding subpoenas was amended in 1991. 44
These amendments included a completely new section of the rule 45 to protect
witnesses from the misuse of a party’s subpoena power. 46 While this
amendment included many new and altered provisions, the relevant amended
section for the unretained, independent researcher is:
Rule 45. Subpoena
(d) Protecting a Person Subject to a Subpoena; Enforcement
(3) Quashing or Modifying a Subpoena
(B) When Permitted. To protect a person subject to or affected by a
subpoena, the court for the district where compliance is required may,
on motion, quash or modify the subpoena if it requires:
(i) disclosing a trade secret or other confidential research,
development, or commercial information; or

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Deitchman, 740 F.2d at 563.
Id. at 560.
Id.
Id. at 564, 566.
Id. at 556.
FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(3)(B)(ii) advisory committee’s note to 1991 amendment.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(3)(B)(ii) advisory committee’s note to 1991 amendment.
FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c) advisory committee’s note to 1991 amendment.
FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(3) advisory committee’s note to 1991 amendment.
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(ii) disclosing an unretained expert’s opinion or information that
does not describe specific occurrences in dispute and results from
47
the expert’s study that was not requested by a party.

A.

The Need for the Rule: Same Case, Three Times

Among the growing trend of using subpoenas to compel the researcher into
providing the underlying data was Richard Snyder, who challenged a subpoena
issued upon him by American Motor Corporation on three separate
occasions. 48 American Motor Corporation subpoenaed Snyder’s underlying
data used to support his co-authored study for the Insurance Institute for
Highway Safety. 49 Snyder’s article, titled “On-Road Crash Experience of
Utility Vehicles,” analyzed accident reports and engineering studies of utility
vehicles. 50 While most of the study’s conclusions were on general
characteristics of utility vehicle accidents, a few conclusions singled out
certain vehicles, such as the Jeep, as being more hazardous than others. 51
American Motor Corporation needed the underlying data in order to contest the
opposing experts’ opinions about the safety of the Jeep vehicle, derived from
the conclusions presented in Snyder’s study. 52
In Buchanan v. American Motors Corp., the Sixth Circuit affirmed the
district court’s decision to quash the subpoena for the production of all the
research data and documents related to the study. 53 The court began its
reasoning by identifying Snyder as a stranger to the litigation currently
pending, who is not an expert witness or adviser to any party involved in the
litigation. 54 The court said the scope of discovery is in the sound discretion of
the district court, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in quashing
the subpoena on the grounds that the subpoena was unreasonably
burdensome. 55 The court explained ordering compliance would require Snyder,
an expert who has no direct connection with the litigation, to spend an

47. FED. R. CIV. P. 45(d)(3)(B). This section was originally under the (c) heading but the
revisions in 2013 moved this to the (d) section. FED. R. CIV. P. 45(d) advisory committee’s note
to 2013 amendment.
48. Buchanan v. Am. Motors Corp., 697 F.2d 151, 151–52 (6th Cir. 1983); Wright v. Jeep
Corp., 547 F. Supp. 871, 872–73 (E.D. Mich. 1982); In re Snyder, 115 F.R.D. 211, 211–12 (D.
Ariz. 1987). American Motors Corporation is the owner and manufacturer of the Jeep brand. See
id. at 212.
49. Buchanan, 697 F.2d at 152; Wright, 547 F. Supp. at 873; In re Snyder, 115 F.R.D. at
212.
50. In re Snyder, 115 F.R.D. at 212; Wright, 547 F. Supp. at 873.
51. In re Snyder, 115 F.R.D. at 212; Wright, 547 F. Supp. at 873.
52. Buchanan, 697 F.2d at 152; Wright, 547 F. Supp. at 873; In re Snyder, 115 F.R.D. at
212.
53. Buchanan, 697 F.2d at 152.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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unreasonable amount of time disclosing all of the raw data, including
thousands of documents, accumulated over the course of a long and detailed
research study. 56 Further, the court supported its reasoning with the
observation that Snyder is not being called as an expert witness with
observations concerning the accident or because no other experts are available,
but because American Motors Corporation wants to prove Snyder’s research
study is not well founded. 57
In Wright v. Jeep Corp., the District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan ordered the subpoena be modified to reduce the burden on Snyder
producing the requested documents with the payment of a reasonable fee for
his information and services. 58 Initially the court began by describing the
relationship between conclusions contained in research reports and the
underlying data from which these conclusions are drawn. 59 The underlying
data is analyzed, compared, and contrasted by the researcher to document and
support the conclusions contained within the researcher’s report. 60 The value
of the conclusions turns upon the quality of the data, the methods of analysis
used by the researcher, and the skill and perception of the researcher. 61 Thus, if
the conclusions of a research effort are to be fairly tested, the underlying data
must be available to others equally skilled and perceptive. 62
With this relationship in mind, the Wright court then began its discussion
by saying “‘[t]he public . . . has a right to every man’s evidence,’ except for
those persons protected by a constitutional, common-law, or statutory
privilege.” 63 As such, the court needed to determine if a public policy reason
existed to prevent Snyder from being subject to the subpoena. 64 The court
rejected Snyder’s reasoning that he did not have to comply with the subpoena
because of a court rule, 65 academic privilege, 66 and the First Amendment. 67
However, the court listened to Snyder’s claim being subject to the subpoena

56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Wright v. Jeep Corp., 547 F. Supp. 871, 877 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
59. Id. at 874.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Wright, 547 F. Supp. at 873 (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1973)
(quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972))).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 874 (“There is nothing in the federal rules that creates an exemption for the
respondent [Snyder] from providing the relevant material requested.”).
66. Id. at 875 (“The respondent [Snyder] offers no case to support an academic privilege. . . .
This court is unwilling to create a new privilege that would shield academics from testifying.”).
67. Id. (“[T]he court does not believe that compelling Professor Snyder to testify violates
any first amendment rights.”).
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would be burdensome, but did not quash the subpoena. 68 Instead, the court
determined the solution was not to prevent disclosure because it is too
burdensome but to lessen the burden in order to permit the information to
become available. 69 The court explained every person is burdened by having to
disclose knowledge he or she acquired for the purposes of litigation, even
though it is acquired by accident. 70 But this burden can be lessened, favoring
disclosure, if measures are taken, such as payment of a reasonable fee. 71 Thus,
Snyder must still disclose his information, but the court would consider each
parties’ recommendation on how to lessen the burden. 72
In In re Snyder, Snyder was once again faced with a subpoena from
American Motors Corporation. 73 In Snyder, the District Court for the District
of Arizona agreed with the Sixth Circuit, and quashed the subpoena 74 because
it was unduly burdensome. 75 This court once again explained Snyder’s
relationship to the litigation and how the subpoena only sought the underlying
information supporting the study, not Snyder’s expert conclusions. 76
Analyzing the burden to Snyder, the court said the series of legal skirmishes
American Motors Corp. had imposed on a researcher who is a stranger to each
of their lawsuits might be enough on its own to establish the excessively
burdensome discovery standard. 77 The burden of the subpoena was also
unreasonable considering the collateral relationship to the litigation, the
amount of self-impeaching material the report already contained, and the
amount of information sought. 78 American Motors Corp. sought the production
of virtually every piece of paper involved in the study, from the funding
requests, data gathering, data analysis, peer review, and post publication
comments. 79 The subpoena ordered Snyder to explain why any document was
missing and its contents, which would have applied to everything because
Snyder did not personally possess any of these documents. 80 Thus, the court
quashed the subpoena for being unreasonably burdensome. 81
68. Wright, 547 F. Supp. at 877.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 876.
71. Id. at 877.
72. Id.
73. In re Snyder, 115 F.R.D. 211, 211 (D. Ariz. 1987).
74. Id. at 216.
75. Id. at 214.
76. Id. at 212.
77. Id. at 214.
78. In re Snyder, 115 F.R.D. at 214.
79. Id. at 212.
80. Id. at 212. This lawsuit took place seven years after the study was published, where
Snyder had since retired from the University of Michigan and moved to Arizona. Id. at 211–12.
Further, the University of Michigan no longer possessed the information as well. Id. at 212.
81. Id. at 216
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The Court Recognizes the Problems Researcher’s Face

The Snyder court also identified two main problems faced by researchers
in this situation. First, the court explained that one of the greatest problems
researchers face when parties seek to discover their underlying data supporting
published research articles used by party experts is that no final judgment will
ultimately decide the issue once and for all. 82 The potential for repetition and
the lack of finality can create serious problems for a researcher whose work is
relevant to many actions. 83 Neither of the parties ever need to file a claim
against the researcher because they only seek a subpoena to discover the
information the researcher used supporting the published article, not to hold
the researcher liable in any way. 84 As a result, res judicata, the doctrine that
prevents parties from re-litigating the same claim, 85 never applies because the
researcher is never a party to the action. 86 Further, collateral estoppel, the
doctrine preventing the re-litigating of an issue decided against a party in
earlier litigation, 87 does not apply because the issue of discovery is not so
essential to the dispute between the parties to apply. 88 In addition, there is no
statutory limitation period for the relevance of the researcher’s work because
the research becomes relevant once a lawsuit is initiated. 89 Thus, the researcher
is forced to defend himself from each subpoena on a case-by-case basis with
the results of one decision having no preclusive effect on any subsequent
decisions. 90
Second, the court explained any solutions to the serious problems faced by
Snyder are not available under the current rule of procedure and evidence. 91
The protections granted to expert witnesses are not available to Snyder because
they only apply for facts known to and opinions held by experts and acquired
or developed in anticipation of litigation. 92 In addition, the federal procedural
and evidentiary rules simply do not address the question regarding if Snyder
can be compensated when his participation is involuntary, and who has not

82. Id. at 214.
83. In re Snyder, 115 F.R.D. at 215.
84. Id. at 211 (non-party researcher being subpoenaed); Farnsworth v. Procter & Gamble
Co., 758 F.2d 1545, 1546 (11th Cir. 1985) (non-party research center being subpoenaed); In re
Am. Tobacco Co., 880 F.2d 1520, 1522 (2d Cir. 1989) (non-party research doctor being
subpoenaed).
85. Res Judicata, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
86. See In re Snyder, 115 F.R.D. at 214.
87. Collateral Estoppel, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
88. In re Snyder, 115 F.R.D. at 214.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 214–15.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2017]

THE CHALLENGE OF ACHIEVING DISCOVERY FROM THIRD-PARTY

583

witnessed the events giving rise to litigation. 93 The court explained the need
for more certainty in the discovery of academic research when the potential for
repetition and lack of finality can create serious problems for a researcher
whose work is relevant to many actions. 94 The court called for members of the
legal community to propose amendments to the existing rules of procedure that
would increase certainty as to the scope of discovery from these involuntary
expert witnesses. 95 The amendments would come four years later. 96
2.

Why the Different Outcomes?

One of the purposes behind the changes to Rule 45 in the 1991
amendments was to clarify the protections afforded to persons who are
compelled to give information. 97 When analyzing these three decisions, it is
easy to see the differences these amendments were trying to clarify. After all,
these three cases all answered the same question in three different ways. 98
The evolution of these three cases starts with Buchanan v. American
Motors Corp. In Buchanan, the court clearly disfavored the subpoena ordering
the deposition and production of documents from Snyder when the court did
not even feel obligated to address the degree of need American Motors
Corporation’s had regarding discovery. 99 Further, the court appears to treat
Snyder as an unwilling expert the court will not force to testify and give his
opinions for or against a party. The court never refers to Snyder as a third party
expert or as a researcher but instead repeatedly identifies Snyder as an expert
witness who is a stranger to the litigation. 100 In this sense, the court is

93. In re Snyder, 115 F.R.D. at 215.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 216.
96. FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(3) advisory committee’s note, 1991 amendment.
97. FED. R. CIV. P. 45 advisory committee’s note, 1991 amendment, Purpose of Revision.
98. Buchanan v. Am. Motors Corp., 697 F.2d 151, 152 (6th Cir. 1983) (quashing the
subpoena because Snyder was not an expert witness); In re Snyder, 115 F.R.D. 211, 214, 216 (D.
Ariz. 1987) (quashing the subpoena because it was unduly burdensome); Wright v. Jeep Corp.,
547 F. Supp. 871, 877 (E.D. Mich. 1982) (modifying the subpoena to reduce the burden faced by
Snyder).
99. Buchanan, 697 F.2d at 151–52 (the court only states the reason why American Motors
Corp. wants discovery but does not weigh this as a factor to be considered).
100. Id. at 151 (“seeks to subpoena appellee [Snyder], an expert residing in Michigan”)
(emphasis added); Id. at 152 (“Appellee [Snyder] is a stranger to the North Carolina litigation
and is not an expert witness or adviser to any party”) (emphasis added); Id. (“Assuming without
deciding that the expert here . . . has neither an absolute nor qualified privilege”) (emphasis
added); Id. (“Compliance with the subpoena would require the expert who has no direct
connection with the litigation”) (emphasis added); Id. (“[W]e note that the expert is not being
called because of observations . . . concerning the . . . accident . . . or because no other expert
witnesses are available. Appellant [American Motors Corp.] wants . . . to prove . . . the expert’s
written opinions . . . are not well founded.”) (emphasis added); Id. (“The District Court did not err
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considering Snyder as a typical expert witness, one who would be retained by
one party to offer his opinion at trial. Instead, the court needed to consider
Snyder as a witness, with key additional information for the expert witnesses to
use at trial, who is also an expert in the same field as those expert witnesses.
This difference leads to a complete quashing of the subpoena instead of the
solutions reached later.
In Wright, the court starts off with a clear understanding of who Snyder is
and his relationship to the litigation. 101 With this understanding, the court treats
Snyder as a third party witness with information relevant to the litigation at
issue, 102 unlike Buchanan’s treatment of Snyder as an unwilling expert. 103
While both courts use the unduly burdensome standard to reach their
respective decisions, 104 this difference in the treatment of Snyder leads the
Wright court to grant discovery, because Snyder is a third party with relevant
information to the litigation. 105
Finally, in Snyder, the court once again used the unduly burdensome
standard and agreed with Buchanan to quash the subpoena. 106 However, unlike
Buchanan, the Snyder court recognized Snyder’s relationship to the
litigation 107 and did not consider Snyder to be an unwilling expert witness. But
while the Snyder and Wright courts agreed on Snyder’s relationship to the
litigation, 108 the Snyder court quashed the subpoena instead of reducing the
burden like the Wright court. 109 A key difference was the difference in timing
of these two cases.

in finding improper the practice of calling an eminent expert witness (who is a stranger to the
litigation) under a burdensome subpoena . . .”) (emphasis added).
101. Wright, 547 F. Supp. at 872–73.
102. Id. at 873.
103. See supra note 100.
104. Buchanan, 697 F.2d at 152; Wright, 547 F. Supp. at 876.
105. Wright, 547 F. Supp. at 876–77.
106. In re Snyder, 115 F.R.D. at 216.
107. Id. at 211–12.
108. Id.; Wright, 547 F. Supp. at 872–74.
109. Wright, 547 F. Supp. at 877. The Snyder court also disagreed with the Wright court’s
conclusion that if discovery were allowed, Snyder would be entitled to reasonable compensation.
In re Snyder, 115 F.R.D. at 215; Wright, 547 F. Supp. at 877. The Wright court awarded the fee
because it did not believe American Motors Corp. was entitled to the benefits of Snyder’s
research without paying for it. Wright, 547 F. Supp. at 877. In contrast, the Snyder court did not
believe Snyder would be entitled to reasonable compensation because he was not an expert
witness. In re Snyder, 115 F.R.D. at 215. Recognizing that American Motors Corp. only sought
Snyder’s first-hand knowledge of the underlying data, not his opinions, the Snyder court reasoned
Snyder is an ordinary viewer witness to events that are only collaterally relevant to the current
litigation. Id. Since the payment to expert witnesses is the only exception to the common law rule
that witnesses are to be paid for their testimony, Snyder could not be paid because he is not an
expert witness giving his opinion. Id.
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One reason the Snyder court found the request for the underlying data
burdensome was because the request was made seven years after the
publication of the study. 110 During that time, Snyder had retired from the
university where he performed his research, moved to Arizona and no longer
possessed any of the information requested by American Motors
Corporation. 111 However, the request in Wright was made two years after the
publication of the study, while Snyder still worked for the university. 112 This
means Snyder still had access to his research at the university and could still
access the requested information. In addition, the Snyder court could not have
reduced the burden on Snyder because it is impossible to reduce Snyder’s
burden of production when he does not have the documents. 113
B.

The Current State of the Law

One of the overriding purposes of the 1991 amendments to Rule 45 was
“to clarify and enlarge the protections afforded [to] persons who are required
to assist the court by giving information.” 114 Specifically, the purpose behind
the Rule 45(d)(3)(B)(i) amendments was to authorize the court to quash,
modify, or condition a subpoena to protect a person from harmful disclosures
of confidential information. 115 Further, the purpose behind the Rule
45(d)(3)(B)(ii) amendments was to provide “appropriate protection for the
intellectual property of the non-party witness.” 116 The committee recognized
the growing problem of the use of subpoenas to compel the giving of evidence
and information by unretained experts and created this rule to allow unretained
experts to withhold their services and give assurance of reasonable
compensation. 117 The amendment also allowed for the subpoena to be
modified in order to accommodate different competing interests. 118
Seemingly, the second part of this amendment would apply to the
hypothetical situation referenced at the beginning of this article. The plaintiff
sought to disclose the unretained expert’s information that did not describe the
specific injury resulting in litigation but resulted from the expert’s own,
independently conducted study. Further, when such underlying information is
confidential or obtained because of the promise of confidentiality, the first part

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

See In re Snyder, 115 F.R.D. at 211–12.
Id.
Wright, 547 F. Supp. at 872–73.
In re Snyder, 115 F.R.D. at 212.
FED. R. CIV. P. 45 advisory committee’s note, 1991 amendment, Purpose of Revision.
FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(3)(B)(i) advisory committee’s note, 1991 amendment.
FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(3)(B)(ii) advisory committee’s note, 1991 amendment.
Id.
Id.
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of the amendment should also apply. Thus, this amendment should make it
easier for a researcher to defeat a subpoena in this situation.
In practice, these additions to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have
done little to help unretained, third party experts or researchers from disclosing
underlying information supporting their published conclusions.
First, the amendment has done nothing to change the standard used to
determine whether or not discovery should be compelled. Before the
amendment, the courts used a balancing test to determine whether or not to
compel the researcher to disclose the underlying information. 119 As described
in Deitchman, when protection from a subpoena is sought, the court must
apply a balancing test to determine whether the need of the party seeking
disclosure outweighs the adverse effect such disclosure would have on the
policies underlying the claimed privilege. 120 After the 1991 amendment, the
courts continued to use a balancing test to determine whether to compel
discovery. 121 In Cusumano, the court artfully explained:

119. In re Am. Tobacco Co., 880 F.2d 1520, 1529 (2d Cir. 1989) (applying a balancing test of
the need of disclosure against the privilege); Farnsworth v. Procter & Gamble Co., 758 F.2d
1545, 1547 (11th Cir. 1985) (balancing the need to obtain discovery against the need to maintain
the confidentiality of the information); Deitchman v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 740 F.2d 556, 559
(7th Cir. 1984) (performing a balancing test to determine if the need of disclosure outweighs the
claimed privilege); Dow Chem. Co. v. Allen 672 F.2d 1262, 1275 (7th Cir. 1982) (balancing a
privilege against important competing interests); Anker v. G.D. Searle & Co., 126 F.R.D. 515,
518 (M.D. N.C. 1989) (adopting a balancing test, the court weighs the need for discovery against
the harm, prejudice or burden to the other party); In re Snyder, 115 F.R.D. 211, 215 (D. Ariz.
1987) (evaluating the subpoena requires the weighing of burdensomeness, relevance, alternative
sources of the information, needs of the case, and the importance of the issues at stake); Wright v.
Jeep Corp., 547 F. Supp. 871, 873 (E.D. Mich. 1982) (determining whether any public policy
reasons exist to exempt a researcher from providing the requested materials).
120. Deitchman, 740 F.2d at 559.
121. Cusumano v. Microsoft Corp., 162 F.3d 708, 716 (1st Cir. 1998) (applying a balancing
test weighing need against injury); In re Domestic Drywall Antitrust Litig., 300 F.R.D. 234, 239
(E.D. Pa. 2014) (balancing test requires a court to weigh the relevance, need, confidentiality, and
other harm compliance would cause on the subpoenaed party); In re NCAA Student-Athlete
Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., No. 4:12-mc-00508 JAR, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147174, at
*4 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 12, 2012) (balancing the relevance of the information, party’s need, and
hardship to the party subject to the subpoena); Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Int’l Healthcare Worker
Safety Ctr., No. 3:11-MC-28, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89402, at *8 (W.D. Va. Aug. 11, 2011)
(applying a balancing approach); Crescenta Valley Water Dist. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 269 F.R.D.
360, 363–64 (S.D. N.Y. 2010) (weighing the need of the party seeking the discovery against any
undue hardships created by permitting it); In re Bextra & Celebrex Mktg. Sales Practices & Prod.
Liab. Litig., 249 F.R.D. 8, 12 (D. Mass. 2008) (applying a balancing test); Cable v. Weinman,
233 F.R.D. 70, 78–80 (D. Mass. 2006) (weighing the factors of relevance, privilege, cumulative
evidence and undue burden); Bluitt v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 94-2318, 1994 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16933, at *4–7 (E.D. La. Nov. 21, 1994) (weighing the need for confidentiality against
the need for disclosure).
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[W]hen a subpoena seeks divulgement of confidential information compiled by
a journalist or academic researcher in anticipation of publication, courts must
apply a balancing test. This test contemplates consideration of a myriad of
factors, often uniquely drawn out of the factual circumstances of the particular
case. Each party comes to this test holding a burden. Initially, the movant must
make a prima facie showing that his claim of need and relevance is not
frivolous. Upon such a showing, the burden shifts to the objector to
demonstrate the basis for withholding the information. The court then must
place those factors that relate to the movant’s need for the information on one
pan of the scales and those that reflect the objector’s interest in confidentiality
and the potential injury to the free flow of information that disclosure portends
122
on the opposite pan.

Therefore, even with the 1991 amendments, the researcher is still subject to a
balancing test to determine if their need in resisting discovery outweighs the
needs of the parties in litigation. 123
The reasons courts continue to apply the balancing test after the
amendment is because the amendment application itself is discretionary. The
amendment tells the court is may modify or quash a subpoena. Since the
amendment does not tell the courts they have to take one action or another, but
instead lets the courts decide, the courts simply continued to exercise the
discretion they had before the amendment.
Further, if the unretained, third party expert wants to challenge the
subpoena, they must go to court and argue the uncertainty of a balancing test to
determine whether or not they have to comply with the subpoena. To a person
who is not related to the litigation, this may seem like a daunting,
unnecessarily expensive and fundamentally unfair request. The researcher has
no desire to be part of the case, because if they did, they could simply become

122. Cusumano, 162 F.3d at 716 (internal citations omitted); see also In re Domestic Drywall
Antitrust Litig., 300 F.R.D. at 239:
The serve-and-volley of the federal discovery rules govern the resolution of a motion to
quash. The subpoenaing party must first show that its requests are relevant to its claims or
defenses, within the meaning of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1). Next, the
burden shifts to the subpoenaed nonparty who must show that disclosure of the
information is protected under Rule 45(d)(3)(A) or (B). If the subpoenaed nonparty claims
the protections under Rule 45(d)(3)(B) or asserts that disclosure would subject it to undue
burden under Rule 45(d)(3)(A), it must show that disclosure will cause it a clearly defined
and serious injury. This burden is particularly heavy to support a motion to quash as
contrasted to some more limited protection such as a protective order. (internal citations
omitted) (internal quotations omitted).
123. Retractable Techs., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89402, at *7–8 (noting Rule 45(c)(3)(B)
allows a court to protect confidential information by modifying or quashing a subpoena, applying
a balancing test to decide); Fanjoy v. Calico Brands, Inc., No. 2:06-mc-469, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 55158, at *12 (D. Utah Aug. 7, 2006) (noting Rule 45(c)(3)(B) allows courts to balance
the needs of confidentiality against the need for disclosure).
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a retained expert for a party and be paid. Further, the independent researcher
does not want to bear the cost of challenging a subpoena. Unlike the plaintiffs
in litigation who chose to enter into a lawsuit and bear litigations expenses, or
the defendants who may have been expecting litigation or at least have some
control over its expense, an independent researcher has no such options. By
being compelled by a subpoena, the researcher is forced to hand over the
information, incurring the financial and potentially harmful research cost
associated, or incur the cost of challenging the subpoena which may still result
in the information being turned over. In addition, if the researcher obtained his
or her information using confidentiality agreements, the researcher may be
forced to spend money to challenge the subpoena or face liability for breaking
those agreements.
Second, what little impact the amendment had was procedural in allowing
the third party expert to combat the subpoena. Before the amendment, courts
were not uniform on what procedural law(s) governed the ability for
unretained, third party experts to challenge the subpoena. Courts allowed the
third party experts to challenge the subpoena by treating the challenge as a
regular motion to quash a subpoena, 124 by combining the Rule 26 and Rule 45
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 125 or by solely following Rule 26 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure regarding protective orders. 126 Such
difference may be explained by one court that said the available Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure simply do not address gaining discovery from this kind of
expert. 127 Thus, the courts were left to fend for themselves and determine what
procedural law applied.
After the amendment, most courts agreed the amendment now governed
subpoenas seeking discovery from this type of expert. 128 However, the First

124. Buchanan v. Am. Motors Corp., 697 F.2d 151, 152 (6th Cir. 1983) (quashing a subpoena
based on the subpoena being unreasonably burdensome); Dow Chem. Co., 672 F.2d at 1266
(allowing the district court to decide how to enforce the subpoena); Wright, 547 F. Supp. at 872
(appealing a decision to quash a subpoena).
125. Deitchman, 740 F.2d at 559 (7th Cir. 1984) (applying both Rule 26 and Rule 45); Anker
v. G.D. Searle & Co., 126 F.R.D. 515, 518 (M.D. N.C. 1989) (applying both Rule 26 and 45
when evaluating a challenge to a subpoena); Kennedy v. Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 115 F.R.D.
497, 499 (D. Conn.1987) (using Rules 26 and 45 to quash the subpoena and seek a protective
order); In re Snyder, 115 F.R.D. 211, 214 (D. Ariz. 1987) (using Rules 26 and 45 to quash the
subpoena and seek a protective order).
126. Farnsworth v. Procter & Gamble Co., 758 F.2d 1545, 1547 (11th Cir. 1985) (using a
Rule 26 protective orders to modify a subpoena). Rule 26(c) allows a party subject to discovery to
move for a protective order and Rule 45(b) allows the subpoena to be quashed or modified.
Deitchman, 740 F.2d at 559.
127. In re Snyder, 115 F.R.D. at 215.
128. In re Domestic Drywall Antitrust Litig., 300 F.R.D. 234, 239 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (applying
Rule 45(d)(3)(B) in a balancing test); Retractable Techs., Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89402, at
*7–8 (applying Rule 45(c)(3)(B)); Crescenta Valley Water Dist. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 269
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Circuit in Cusumano continued to treat this issue under Rule 26 regarding
discovery explaining discovery rules apply to subpoenas issued under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 45. 129 In reality such distinctions of what procedural
law(s) apply do not substantively matter. As explained above, the courts, both
before and after the amendment, still apply a balancing test to determine the
merits of the challenge. But one such difference the amendment makes is the
clarity it provides. First, experts now know exactly what to do in order to
challenge the subpoena in court, instead of guessing on what procedural law
applies. Second, the rule provides a list of information subject to protection
instead of relying on the more general undue burden reasoning generally
required by both Rule 26 protective orders and Rule 45 protection from
subpoenas.
Finally, this amendment only applies when the expert is a third party to the
litigation. When the unretained researcher used a source for their research that
is now a party to the litigation, the researcher is no longer a third party. 130 The
researcher now has first-hand factual knowledge directly related to one of the
parties in the litigation. 131 Such factual information describing specific events
and occurrences involved in the dispute are not shielded by Rule
45(c)(3)(B)(ii). 132 Thus, the researcher is no longer a third party to the
litigation but a fact witness, no longer protected by Rule 45(c)(3)(B)(ii). 133
III. TRYING TO PROTECT THE INFORMATION
Researchers have attempted many different ways to protect themselves
from being subject to the disclosure required by the subpoena. 134 Unfortunately
for the researchers, most of these methods fail, 135 but some succeed in
preventing discovery to varying degrees. 136
A.

Unsuccessful Attempts to Protect the Information

Several different attempts by researchers to resist discovery have been
unsuccessful. Such unsuccessful attempts include the researchers claiming they

F.R.D. 360, 363 (S.D. N.Y. 2010) (applying Rule 45(c)(3)(B)(i)); Fanjoy, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
55158, at *6 (applying Rule 45(c)(3)(B)(i)); Bluitt v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 94-2318,
1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16933, at *4–5 (E.D. La. Nov. 21, 1994) (analyzing the applicability of
Rule 45(c)(3)(B)).
129. Cusumano v. Microsoft Corp., 162 F.3d 708, 714 (1st Cir. 1998).
130. Cable v. Weinman, 233 F.R.D. 70, 77 (D. Mass. 2006).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See id.
134. See infra Part III. A–B.
135. See infra Part III. A.
136. See infra Part III. B.
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are protected as researchers, protected by court rule, protected by the First
Amendment, and protected by the expert’s privilege.
1.

Researcher Protection

The court in Wright v. Jeep Corp. refused to give academic researchers
protection from being subject to a subpoena solely because they are academic
researchers. 137 The court refused to recognize such an academic privilege when
no support was provided to show that such a privilege is recognized. 138 The
court was unwilling to create the privilege because privileges are the exception
to the general duty of every citizen to provide evidence when necessary for
justice and, as such, such exceptions are not lightly created or expansively
construed. 139
2.

Court Rule

In Wright v. Jeep Corp., Snyder again claimed he did not have to provide
any documents because he was not a retained expert. 140 Snyder’s argument
was premised on the fact he did not fall within any of the subcategories
specifically addressing the discovery of experts in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, and thus could not be compelled by them. 141 The court was quick to
point out the error in Snyder’s argument, explaining “the administration of
justice requires testimony of all persons unless reasons are established to the
contrary.” 142 Since Snyder was not an expert under these rules, these
procedures did not apply to him, and thus the only question for disclosure is if
the material was relevant. 143 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure state a party
may obtain discovery regarding any matter which is relevant to the subject
matter involved in the pending action. 144 Because there was a high probability
Snyder’s research would be used at trial, through expert witnesses, and the
underlying facts of the study support the study’s conclusions, the underlying
facts are relevant to determine the validity of the expert’s conclusions. 145
Therefore, nothing in the federal rules prevents the disclosure of the underlying
information. 146

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Wright v. Jeep Corp., 547 F. Supp. 871, 875 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 874.
Id.
Wright, 547 F. Supp. at 874.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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First Amendment

Once again in Wright v. Jeep Corp., Snyder tried another basis for resisting
the subpoena, claiming the First Amendment protection. 147 While the court
agreed a court ordered subpoena provides enough government action to raise a
constitutional question, the court determined the First Amendment did not
apply. 148 The protection of the First Amendment affords the right to write and
speak; it does not give a right to withdraw published material from public
scrutiny. 149 Nor does the First Amendment give a right to refuse to disclose
facts that are relevant in making a judgment as to the correctness of the
published material. 150 Further, the court noted the limited protection given to
reporters and writers under the First Amendment is given to preserve the flow
of information from sources. 151 This protection is given to protect confidential
sources, in order to not jeopardize the flow of information. 152 However, in
Wright, the confidentiality of Snyder’s sources were not at issue, thus there
was no First Amendment concern. 153
In addition, the court in Wright explained the possibility of being
subpoenaed to testify exists for everyone. 154 At any time a person can see or
hear something that will cause him or her to be subpoenaed to testify. 155 Every
person is subject to a subpoena to tell or produce information about what he or
she observed. 156 In many respects, an academic researcher is no different than
any other witness who may be called upon to give evidence. 157
4.

Expert’s Privilege

Some researchers in this discovery situation, still believing they are subject
to the traditional and more common rule regarding experts, attempt to claim
the expert’s privilege to avoid the production demanded by the subpoena. 158
The expert’s privilege is available to experts who have no personal connection
to a case and gives the expert an absolute privilege to not be compelled to give
his or her opinions at trial. 159 In one such case, In re American Tobacco Co.,

147. Wright, 547 F. Supp. at 875.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 876.
152. Wright, 547 F. Supp. at 876.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Wright, 547 F. Supp. at 876.
158. In re Am. Tobacco Co., 880 F.2d 1520, 1527 (2d Cir. 1989).
159. Id. In diversity cases, the existence of a privilege is determined by state law, and this is
the expert’s privilege as defined by New York law. Id. Other states have a similar approach to the
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the court quickly dismissed such a claim of privilege by concluding that no
expert is being asked to testify or to prepare a report for litigation. 160 Since the
expert is not being compelled to give their opinions for litigation, the expert
privilege does not apply. 161
B.

Some Protection Granted

Researchers are not completely helpless to resist discovery. Researchers
can attempt to use any number of methods to quash the subpoena, included
claiming the research scholar’s privilege, journalist’s privilege, attorney client
privilege, and confidentiality. However, as illustrated by the following cases,
these protections are very limited and often only applicable in certain specific
situations. In fact, even though these methods may provide some relief to the
researcher, often complete dismissal of such a discovery request is
unattainable.
1.

Research Scholar’s Privilege

The Research Scholar’s Privilege protects researchers from disclosing their
research. 162 This privilege is also called the researchers’ privilege, academic
privilege, or academic freedom privilege depending on the jurisdiction. 163 The
research scholar’s privilege can be considered a narrower version of the
expert’s privilege, but instead of preventing the expert researcher from
disclosing opinions, the research scholar’s privilege prevents the disclosure of

compelling of expert opinions at trial. Lombardo v. Gardner, 82 Pa. D. & C.4th 233, 242 (Pa.
C.P. Lawrence Cnty. 2007) (“It is well established in Pennsylvania that an expert witness cannot
be compelled to testify as to his opinion against his will.”); Kridos v. Vinskus, 483 So. 2d 727,
731 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (an expert may not be compelled to testify purely because he is an
expert, but only because he has information bearing rather directly on the case). Other
jurisdictions have a more discretionary approach to compelling expert testimony. Mason v.
Robinson, 340 N.W.2d 236, 242 (Iowa 1983) (before the court compels an expert to testify and
absent any other connection to the litigation, the compelling party must demonstrate compelling
necessity that overcomes the expert’s and public’s need for protection); Carney-Hayes v.
Northwest Wis. Home Care, Inc., 699 N.W.2d 524, 534 (Wis. 2005) (“To compel an expert to
testify involuntarily, a party must not only show a compelling need for the testimony but also
present a plan of reasonable compensation.”).
160. In re Am. Tobacco Co., 880 F.2d at 1527–28.
161. See id.
162. Id. at 1528; see Dow Chem. Co. v. Allen, 672 F.2d 1262, 1275 (7th Cir. 1982)
(discussing the privilege in terms of academic freedom but having the same effect of preventing
the disclosure of research).
163. Frank C. Woodside, III & Michael J. Gray, Researchers’ Privilege: Full Disclosure, 32
T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 1, 7 (2015). However, these privilege names can also refer to completely
different privileges as well. EEOC v. Univ. of Notre Dame du Lac, 715 F.2d 331, 333–34 (7th
Cir. 1983) (claiming academic privilege in the peer review process of determining the tenure
status for a professor).
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the information those opinions stem from. Currently, the Second and Seventh
Circuits have expressly applied this privilege to successfully and
unsuccessfully protect independent researchers and their underlying research
data. 164 A key distinction used by courts when determining the success of this
privilege is whether the research has been published yet or in the process of
being prepared to be published. 165
In Dow Chemical Co. v. Allen, the court touched upon such a privilege
while discussing academic freedom, the ability for research to be carried on
without interference from the government or community. 166 In Dow Chemical
Co., Dow Chemical Company sought the underlying information supporting
several unfinished studies 167 suggesting a chemical compound Dow
manufactures can be dangerous. 168 The court explained there were several
reasons the researchers would face a chilling effect on their research when
their studies had not yet been published. 169 First, enforcing the subpoenas
before the studies had completed would leave the researchers with the
knowledge, throughout the remainder of their studies, that their results were
being actively scrutinized by a biased third party. 170 Such a burden on the
researchers could be unnerving, discouraging and limit their fearlessness in
pursuit of information. 171 Second, the premature disclosure of the underlying
information would jeopardize both the studies and the researchers’ careers. 172
Such disclosure would make the studies unfit for scientific publication, would
bypass the peer review process, harm their credibility and risk total destruction
of the research. 173 Therefore, the subpoena was quashed because any
disclosure of the research data would be premature. 174
In In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litigation, a
researcher challenged a subpoena requesting the underlying data and the

164. Dow Chem. Co., 672 F.2d 1262 at 1276–77; In re Am. Tobacco Co., 880 F.2d 1520 at
1529. While not expressly applying the research scholar’s privilege, a District Court in the Eighth
Circuit has acknowledged the validity of the policies supporting the privilege in its protection of
research data before the study is published. In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness
Licensing Litig., No. 4:12-mc-00508 JAR, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147174, at *8–9 (E.D. Mo.
Oct. 12, 2012).
165. In re Am. Tobacco Co., 880 F.2d at 1529; Dow Chem. Co., 672 F.2d at 1276; In re
NCAA, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147174, at *8.
166. Dow Chem. Co., 672 F.2d at 1275.
167. Id. at 1273.
168. Id. at 1266.
169. Id. at 1276. The studies at issue were not completed or subject to peer review. Id. at
1268.
170. Id.
171. Dow Chemical Co., 672 F.2d at 1276.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1273.
174. Id. at 1278.
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unpublished study, still in the peer review process. 175 The court applied a
balancing test 176 and considered the fact that the article had not been published
and was still subject to peer review. 177 The court explained peer review is a
critical step in finalizing a research study, for it is only after this process that
the academic piece considered finished. 178 Revealing an article before the peer
review process is complete could reveal conclusions that will differ from the
final, published article, thereby undermining the article and researchers
credibility. 179 The court then granted the researcher’s protective order in part to
prevent premature disclosure but ordered the study and data be turned over
once the peer review process was done. 180
In In re American Tobacco Co., the court held if the research scholar’s
privilege did exist, it did not apply. 181 American Tobacco was attempting to
obtain the underlying data from a research doctor who published several
studies suggesting a significant increase in the likelihood of cancer when
smoking is combined with exposure to asbestos. 182 The court explained there
would be no chilling effect on scientific research because the information
requested was used for studies long since published. 183 The court noted the few
times such a privilege had existed was to protect researchers from premature
disclosure of their research. 184 Thus, the research scholar’s privilege did not
apply. 185
2.

Journalist Privilege

In Cusumano v. Microsoft Corp., the court ruled academic researchers
should be afforded protection similar to that which the law provides for
journalists. 186 The court concluded the same concerns regarding discovery

175. In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litigation, No. 4:12-mc00508 JAR, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147174, at *1. (E.D. Mo. Oct. 12, 2012).
176. Id. at *3.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. In re NCAA, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147174, at *4. For a discussion on the treatment of
discovery regarding the peer review notes themselves, see In re Bextra & Celebrex Mktg. Sales
Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig., 249 F.R.D. 8, 12. (D. Mass. 2008). There, the court declined to
allow the peer review comments to be discoverable in the interest of maintaining the
confidentiality of the peer review process. Id. at 15.
181. In re Am. Tobacco Co., 880 F.2d 1520, 1529 (2d Cir. 1989).
182. Id. at 1522.
183. Id. at 1529.
184. Id. at 1528.
185. Id. at 1530.
186. Cusumano v. Microsoft Corp., 162 F.3d 708, 714 (1st Cir. 1998). The underlying action
against Microsoft involved the U.S. Department of Justice charging Microsoft with federal
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requests of journalists, the undermining of gathering and dissemination of
information, also applied to academic researchers. 187 The court reasoned
scholars are information gatherers and disseminators as well and if their
research materials were freely subject to subpoena, sources would stop
confiding in them. 188 As with reporters, a drying-up of sources sharply limits
the information available to researchers, thus restricting their output. 189 Just as
a journalist, stripped of his sources, would write fewer and less insightful
articles, an academic, stripped of sources, would also write fewer and less
insightful studies. 190 The court concluded such similarities of concern and
function mandate a similar level of protection for journalists and academic
researchers. 191 However, the court noted such protection is only available to
the same extent available for journalists, usually just confidential
information. 192
In Cusumano, the academics were granted access to Netscape’s employees
and their business practices because of the academics promise of
confidentiality. 193 The court applied a balancing test and determined the
promise of confidentiality outweighed the need for discovery, 194 even though
Microsoft had a legitimate need and use for the information. 195 The court
reasoned scholars studying management practices depend upon the voluntary
disclosures of industry insiders to develop the facts supporting conclusions. 196
These insiders lack a reason for divulging confidential business information
such that the promises of confidentiality are needed to give a sense of security
to facilitate the agreement to be interviewed. 197 Thus, allowing a competitor to
have access to these interviews will not only harm these academics’ future
research efforts, but other researchers as well when promises of confidentiality
can be defeated. 198

antitrust violations for requiring computer manufactures to install Internet Explorer if they wished
to install the Windows operating system on their computers. Id. at 710–11.
187. Id. at 714.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Cusumano, 162 F.3d at 714.
192. Id. at 715.
193. Id. at 711.
194. Id. at 717.
195. Id. at 716.
196. Cusumano, 162 F.3d at 717.
197. Id.
198. Id.
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Attorney Client Privilege

Studies and published research papers do not just come from academic
researchers associated with universities but from any person who has acquired
information on a topic. Such information can be easily gathered over the
course of one’s career as a lawyer.
In Cable v. Wienman, an attorney published an article in the IPO Journal
which stated the underwriting fees for services related to Initial Public
Offerings (IPO) was fixed at 7%. 199 The litigation involved an antitrust action
against banks for conspiring to fix underwriting fees for IPOs at 7%. 200 The
attorney had formed his opinion about underwriting fees based on his twentyfive years of experience dealing with IPOs. 201 The attorney argued the
information sought was protected by attorney client privilege. 202 The court
agreed but identified certain situations where such a privilege would not
apply. 203 Thus, since only the testimony of the attorney was sought to
determine the factual underpinnings of the attorney’s conclusions, 204 such a
privilege could be easily invoked during the attorney’s deposition if the
privilege applied. 205
4.

Confidentiality

Researchers always raise the issue of confidentiality as a key reason why
disclosure should not be allowed. Quite often, the party seeking disclosure will
limit its request to allow the researcher to redact any confidential information
in an attempt to avoid claims of confidentiality. 206 However, confidentiality is
not always available, causing researchers, who still wish to prevent disclosure,
to claim other reasons disclosure should not be granted. 207
Confidentiality is used in a variety of ways depending upon the nature of
the confidentiality, why confidentiality was obtained, and other facts
surrounding the case. Most often, arguing confidentiality will only grant a
researcher a protective order to protect the disclosure of the confidential
information as demonstrated by the following cases:

199. Cable v. Weinman, 233 F.R.D. 70, 72–73 (D. Mass. 2006).
200. Id. at 72.
201. Id. at 73.
202. Id. at 78.
203. Id. at 78–79.
204. Cable, 233 F.R.D. at 76.
205. Id. at 80.
206. Dow Chemical Co. v. Allen, 672 F.2d 1262, 1277 (7th Cir. 1982); In re Am. Tobacco
Co., 880 F.2d 1520, 1525 (2d Cir. 1989).
207. Wright v. Jeep Corp., 547 F. Supp 871, 875–76 (E.D. Mich. 1982) (requested material
was not confidential, so the researcher tried to claim privilege and first amendment protection);
see also Crescenta Valley Water Dist. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 269 F.R.D. 360, 364–65 (S.D. N.Y.
2010) (arguing undue burden to prevent discovery).
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• Deitchman v. E.R. Squibb & Sons: The court issued a protective order to
208
allow discovery while protecting any confidential medical information.
• Farnsworth v. Procter & Gamble Co.: The court upheld a protective order
allowing a research center to redact the personal information of women who
209
participated in a research study.
• Kennedy v. Connecticut Department of Public Safety: The court refused to
quash the subpoena on the basis of confidentiality but allowed the
researcher to redact the names of individuals who provided information on
210
the basis of confidentiality.
• Fanjoy v. Calico Brands, Inc.: To protect the confidentiality of the study’s
participants, the court ordered only the disclosure of age and genders of
211
individual participants.
• Retractable Techs., Inc. v. International Healthcare Worker Safety Center:
Discovery was allowed because the protective order allowed for the
212
protection of confidential information.

Arguments made by researchers that the disclosure of any information,
confidential or not, will destroy future efforts to collect data, 213 inhibit the
researcher’s ability to find future study participants, 214 or violate the
confidentiality terms promised to the study participants in order to gain the
participants’ participation 215 are only effective at achieving a protective order,
not quashing the subpoena. One court has said “quashing a subpoena is
inappropriate where confidentiality interests can be safeguarded by means of a
protective order.” 216 Thus, when a protective order can be effective in
safeguarding and minimizing any potential harm to confidentiality interests,
such an order is the appropriate action to balance the competing interests of the
researcher and the party seeking discovery. 217
Defeating a subpoena on the sole basis of confidentiality is an almost
insurmountable task. In a rare case, the sole reason of confidentiality was
successfully used to prevent the discovery of underlying data in Bluitt v. R.J.

208. Deitchman v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 740 F.2d 556, 564 (7th Cir. 1984).
209. Farnsworth v. Procter & Gamble Co., 758 F.2d 1545, 1546–48 (11th Cir. 1985).
210. Kennedy v. Connecticut Dep’t of Public Safety, 115 F.R.D. 497, 501 (D. Conn. 1987).
211. Fanjoy v. Calico Brands, Inc., No. 2:06-mc-469, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55158, at *13
(D. Utah Aug. 7, 2006).
212. Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Int’l Healthcare Worker Safety Ctr., No. 3:11-MC-28, 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89402, at *8–9 (W.D. Va. Aug. 11, 2011).
213. Deitchman, 740 F.2d at 559–60.
214. Farnsworth, 758 F.2d at 1547.
215. Kennedy, 115 F.R.D. at 501 (disclosing such individuals would needlessly jeopardize the
important researcher-subject relationship); Fanjoy, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55158, at *12–13;
Retractable Techs., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89402, at *8.
216. Retractable Techs., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89402, at *8.
217. See id. at *8–9.
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Reynolds Tobacco Co. 218 The court explained how the requesting party was
unable to show the necessary level of need, required by Rule 45(c)(3)(B), to
overcome confidentiality because the opposing party’s experts had not yet
been shown to rely on the study. 219 Thus, instead of a protective order to
maintain confidentiality, the court determined quashing the subpoena was
appropriate, but the court left the issue open to review if the study would be
relied upon by experts. 220
Using confidentiality to quash a subpoena and dismiss the discovery
request is more likely to be successful when combining it with other
arguments. In Cusumano v. Microsoft Corp., the researchers used
confidentiality to help support their side of a balancing test after claiming a
type of journalistic privilege. 221 The court explained the need for the
researchers to maintain their promise of confidentiality to research participants,
who otherwise would not have agreed to disclose any information. 222 The court
used the need for confidentiality, along with other factors, including First
Amendment values and the non-party status, to show that the researchers
prevailed on the balancing test and quashed the subpoena. 223
IV. RE-EXAMINING THE SITUATION
With the deck stacked against the researcher and the inevitable order
compelling discovery waiting, what can researchers do to protect themselves?
A.

Is the Research Scholar’s Privilege Worth Revisiting?

Perhaps the most consistent and reliable tool researchers have used to
defeat the discovery subpoena is the research scholar’s privilege. When
applied, the few courts that have addressed this privilege have consistently
refused to allow discovery when the following elements are present:
1. Independent, Third Party Researcher;
2. The only connection between the litigation and the researcher, is the
research currently being conducted by the researcher; and

218. Bluitt v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 94-2318, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16933, at *4,
*8 (E.D. La. Nov. 21, 1994).
219. Id. at *4–5.
220. Id. at *7.
221. Cusumano v. Microsoft Corp., 162 F.3d 708, 716–17 (1st Cir. 1998).
222. Id. at 717.
223. Id. Compelling the disclosure of these research materials would reduce the free flow of
information to the public, harming a fundamental First Amendment value. Id. The court also
iterated non-parties have a different set of expectations in litigation and concern for the unwanted
burden thrust upon non-parties is a factor entitled to special weight. Id.
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224

The problem for researchers is the fourth element. As currently tailored
and applied by the courts, the research scholar’s privilege is only viable when
the research has not been published. While this has helped a few researchers
resist discovery, it does not help the vast majority of researchers who have
already published their findings. Could researchers try and expand this
privilege and protect the data once the research is published?
Probably not. The fourth element, the requirement that the research is not
yet published, is the most important element and the reason why the privilege
has been so successful at preventing discovery. Courts have continuously been
persuaded by the harmful effects premature disclosure of research will have
including: (1) subjecting the researchers to the knowledge their research will
be scrutinized by biased third parties with opposite interests; 225 (2)
jeopardizing the research studies and the researchers’ careers; 226 (3) making
the research data vulnerable to preemptive or predatory publication by
others; 227 and (4) maintaining the peer review process to finalize and add
credibility to a research study. 228 Several circuits, including the Second,
Seventh, and Eighth, as well as various states including, California, Louisiana,
and the District of Columbia, have found this reasoning to be persuasive and
adopted a similar approach to the research scholar’s privilege. 229 But once the
research articles have been published, these harmful effects are no longer
present to resist discovery. 230
Privileges protect certain privacy interests the court has recognized as
significant. 231 Privileges exist because there are public policy reasons the
information should not be disclosed. 232 Privileges represent a compromise, a

224. Dow Chem. Co. v. Allen, 672 F.2d 1262, 1276–77 (7th Cir. 1982); In re NCAA StudentAthlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., No. 4:12-mc-00508 JAR, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
147174, at *7–8 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 12, 2012) (finding a general research scholar’s privilege would
not apply, but noting these four elements are present and important in the decision not to grant
discovery); see also Deitchman v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 740 F.2d 556, 560 (7th Cir. 1984)
(agreeing with the Allen court that such a privilege exists under these conditions).
225. Dow Chem. Co., 672 F.2d at 1276.
226. Id.
227. In re Am. Tobacco Co., 880 F.2d 1520, 1529 (2d Cir. 1989).
228. In re NCAA, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147174, at *8.
229. Dow Chem. Co., 672 F.2d at 1262, 1276–77; In re Am. Tobacco Co., 880 F.2d at 1529;
In re NCAA, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147174, at *8–9; Humane Society of U.S. v. Superior Court,
214 Cal. App. 4th 1233, 1263 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013); In re Philip Morris, 706 So. 2d 665, 667–68
(La. Ct. App. 1998); Plough, Inc. v. National Academy of Sciences, 530 A.2d 1152, 1157–58
(D.C. 1987).
230. In re Am. Tobacco Co., 880 F.2d at 1529.
231. Robert S. Catz & Jill J. Lange, Judicial Privilege, 22 GA. L. REV. 89, 95 (1987).
232. Privilege, WEX LEGAL DICTIONARY, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/privilege
[https://perma.cc/9RZF-ENSB].
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balancing of interests between one party’s need to keep the information private
and society’s (and the court’s) interest in ascertaining the truth. 233 In creating
the research scholar’s privilege, courts have recognized the privacy interest the
researcher has in maintaining the research process. Further, such a privilege is
reasonable when the public has yet to be exposed to the research itself. 234 But
when the research is published, these privacy interests supporting the research
scholar’s privilege go away.
Once the research article is published, a researcher can no longer claim the
integrity of the research process to prevent disclosure. While researchers have
a right to protect their research when performing the research, they no longer
have that right once the research is published. By publishing their research,
they have publicly invited public thought and comment on their study and its
conclusions. One way to comment on a study is to challenge it, for it is by
challenging and testing scientific conclusions that they become accepted by
both scientists and society. Challenging the result in litigation is but one way
this can happen, with one court saying “[a]n important element in determining
the validity of . . . studies [used at trial] might sometimes require an
opportunity to test the information used in the studies.” 235 While researchers
may prefer their research to be challenged by other academics, in an academic
setting, the reality is once a researcher has published their research, they do not
have a right to prevent the questioning of their work in a manner or method
they do not approve of. However, one court has recognized the judicial process
may not be the best avenue to challenge scientific research, saying:
The validity of opinions formed and expressed in the context of disciplines
other than the law should be tested by the relevant discipline’s requirements
for validity or acceptability. This Court is unwilling to substitute the
adversarial process of the judicial search for truth for the epistemological
236
standards set by other disciplines.

Further, the courts would be dissuaded from expanding the privilege
because the privilege already properly protects researchers. It protects
researchers from outside parties interfering with their research, thus letting the
researchers come to their own conclusions. As currently construed, the
privilege allows researchers to publish studies free from any bias except their
own.
A cause for additional concern for the researcher is that the research
scholar’s privilege is not absolute and does not forever end the discovery
inquiry. Once the research study has been published, the court is then free to
order the disclosure of the information previously granted protection by the
233.
234.
235.
236.

Catz & Lange, supra note 231, at 95–96.
See In re NCAA, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147174, at *7–8.
Farnsworth v. Procter & Gamble Co., 758 F.2d 1545, 1547 (11th Cir. 1985).
In re Snyder, 115 F.R.D. 211, 215–16 (D. Ariz. 1987).
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privilege. 237 Such disclosure can still be subject to a protective order, 238 but
such a result must seem like a loss when the researcher spent so much time and
effort challenging the order to begin with.
B.

Solution: Account for the Demand on the Researcher

As promising as the research scholar’s privilege sounds, as currently
applied, it is too narrow to protect the majority of researchers. Likewise, trying
to expand the other arguments researchers have used to some success at
defeating the subpoena (attorney-client privilege and journalist privilege) will
fail because those situations are too unique and specific and unable to be
generalized to researchers as a whole. In addition, confidentiality will also fail
because its concerns are too easily accommodated with a protective order.
At first, the simple solution to this problem regarding discovery of third
party researcher’s underlying information would be to eliminate discovery
from researchers in this situation. However, the Supreme Court has made clear
such prohibition on discovery, and therefore the collection of evidence, would
never be allowed in our judicial system. 239 Further, the courts recognize the
legitimate need of the parties in litigation to obtain this information for trial. 240
The party seeking discovery needs the information for its trial preparation and
defense. 241 These are very important interests and must not be unnecessarily
infringed upon. 242 Without access to the information, the party seeking
discovery is unable to defend against the claims raised by an expert witness
addressing a critical matter in the litigation. 243 This information is necessary in
order to perform a meaningful cross-examination of the expert witness. 244 The
party seeking discovery is entitled to cross examine the expert witness on the
data underlying their opinions. 245 Cross examination is a fundamental right of
the judicial process and that right should never be restricted, except in the
narrowest of circumstances to prevent its abuse. 246
A solution to this problem cannot be found in a court doctrine but needs to
come from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The rules have already

237. In re NCAA, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147174, at *10–11.
238. Id. at *11.
239. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S.
421, 438 (1932); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 668 (1972).
240. See Deitchman v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 740 F.2d 556, 563 (7th Cir. 1984) (to
properly prepare a defense, access to the underlying data to analyze its accuracy and methodology
is absolutely essential).
241. Farnsworth v. Procter & Gamble Co., 758 F.2d 1545, 1547 (11th Cir. 1985).
242. Id.
243. Deitchman, 740 F.2d at 561.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 562 (citing Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 691 (1931)).
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acknowledged once before the problem of subpoenas being used to compel the
disclosure of evidence and information by un-retained experts and
researchers. 247 It is time they do so once again, but instead of only making
alterations that result in superficial changes, the rules need to acknowledge the
burden these lawsuits are placing on innocent third party researchers and give
the researchers more consideration. By giving the researchers more
consideration, the rules would be recognizing the undue hardship the
researchers are facing from being subject to litigation while preserving the
right for parties in a lawsuit to obtain evidence. Courts have continuously sung
the praises of the public’s right to every man’s evidence 248 but also recognize
non-parties are entitled to special consideration when subject to a subpoena.249
It is time courts start giving that special consideration to non-parties instead of
just calling upon such consideration only when they see fit.
The first way to give researchers more consideration in the litigation is the
awarding of fees, both attorney fees and compensation for the information
sought. By awarding attorney fees to the researcher, the rules are
acknowledging the researcher is a third party to the litigation who, unlike
traditional plaintiffs and defendants, has felt no injury or is subject to
responsibility for that injury. The rules are recognizing the researcher is a
completely detached third party who has no interest whatsoever to be subject
to the demands and costs of litigation. Courts have already awarded attorney’s
fees when the subpoena creates an undue burden and expense on the
researcher, 250 now it is time to recognize these discovery requests are
inherently an undue burden on the researcher automatically deserving of
attorney’s fees. The ability to award the researcher attorney’s fees gives the
researcher some measure of confidence they have a right to challenge the
discovery request and not be completely burdened by it. It gives the researcher
a measure of security when being subjected to such an order.
Further, the researcher should be compensated for the information they
disclose. Unlike traditional evidence, the underlying information supporting
the study sought by the discovering party is the intellectual property of the
researcher. The researcher dedicated a significant amount of time and effort to
collect the information for the purpose of their intellectual and academic
research. The researchers have a significant amount of interest in this
information, which should not be freely given to others. Society has already
recognized this kind of information is entitled to compensation because expert
witnesses, who use this kind of intellectual property at trial, get paid for their

247. FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(3)(B)(ii) advisory committee’s note to 1991 amendment.
248. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974).
249. Cusumano v. Microsoft Corp., 162 F.3d 708, 717 (1st Cir. 1998).
250. Ebert v. C.R. Bard, Inc., No. 1:13-MC-277, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48380, at *10 (M.D.
Pa. Apr. 7, 2014).
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knowledge and testimony. In addition, the comments to the 1991 amendments
themselves indicate that one of the purposes of the changes was to see the
researcher compensated 251 but with no language directly present in the rule
allowing for compensation, very few courts have ever given it. 252 By granting
the researcher compensation for their research, the court is acknowledging the
interest the research has in the information and compensating the researcher for
it. Such compensation lessens the burden felt by the researcher, prevents other
parties from accessing the researchers’ data for free, and once again gives the
researcher some measure of security when being subject to such an order.
Therefore, to better acknowledge the researcher and their innocent third party
status, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure need to be amended to allow these
researchers to recover attorney’s fees and compensation for their research.
Finally, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should also acknowledge the
commitments and promises the researcher made in order to obtain their
information and thus be amended to allow stronger protections of these
promises. When the court compels the researcher to turn over the requested
information, the court is favoring the conflict one set of citizens (the parties in
the lawsuit) are having over the agreement another sets of citizens made (the
researcher and the provider of the research data). Further, it appears the only
reason the court is favoring the parties in the lawsuit is because they are in
court. It is inherently unfair that an agreement between the researcher and the
person who provide the researcher with information can be voided by the court
simply because other parties are having a completely separate disagreement
and, through the selection of their own experts, choose to tangentially involve
the researcher’s work. Therefore, the rules should be amended to better protect
these promises by researchers.

251. FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(3)(B)(ii) advisory committee’s note to 1991 amendment.
252. Of the following nine cases addressing this kind of researcher discovery and applying the
1991 amendments, only one allowed compensation: In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name &
Likeness Licensing Litig., No. 4:12-mc-00508 JAR, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147174, at *10 (E.D.
Mo. Oct. 12, 2012). The rest did not even mention it or determined it was not appropriate. In re
Domestic Drywall Antitrust Litig., 300 F.R.D. 234, 238, 251 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (discussing when
compensation should be given); Ebert v. C.R. Bard, Inc., No. 1:13-MC-277, 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 48380, at *9, *11 (M.D. Penn. Apr. 7, 2014); Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Int’l Healthcare
Worker Safety Ctr., No. 3:11-MC-28, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89402, at *1, *8 (W.D. Va. Aug.
11, 2011); In re Bextra & Celebrex Mktg. Sales Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig., 249 F.R.D. 8, 13,
15 (D. Mass. 2008); Weinman v. Cable, 427 F.3d 49, 52, 53 (1st Cir. 2005); Cable v. Weinman,
233 F.R.D. 70, 76, 80 (D. Mass. 2006); Fanjoy v. Calico Brands, Inc., No. 2:06-mc-469 DB, 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55158, at *6, 19–26 (D. Utah Aug. 7, 2006); Bluitt v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co., No. 94-2318, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16933, at *4, *8 (E.D. La. Nov. 21, 1994).
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CONCLUSION
Independent researchers who publish conclusions resulting from their
academic studies inherently recognize their conclusions will be viewed and
relied upon by others. But one consequence they may not realize is when their
report is used by an expert in litigation, this subjects the researcher to be open
to discovery requests for the information supporting the report’s conclusions.
Once the discovery request is made, the researcher has very little control. They
are subjected to a balancing test, weighing the requesting parties need against
whatever reasons the researcher can argue against discovery. The fact the
researcher is a non-party to the case is only one factor benefiting the researcher
but does not automatically dismiss the request. 253 Other factors the researcher
may claim are confidentiality, privilege, and undue burden, but the court will
weigh these interests and attempt to create a protective order to still allow
some measure of discovery. 254 In order for the researcher to quash the
discovery order, they must show overwhelming and convincing evidence that
their interests outweigh those of the requesting party. 255 This is not easy to do
and as a result, researchers are often ordered to turn over their information to a
certain extent. What limited protection is provided by the research scholar’s
privilege, attorney client privilege, journalist privilege, and confidentiality are
too circumstantial to properly protect researchers. While subjecting researchers
to this discovery and litigation cannot be eliminated, the burden can be reduced
by acknowledging the demand on the researcher, compensating them in the
form of attorney’s fees and cost of research, and protecting the promises the
researchers made to receive their information. Such changes must come from
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure but until they do, independent scientific
researchers are at the mercy of litigation they have nothing to do with, only
increasing the inherent tension between science and litigation.
STEVEN N. LEVITT *

253. Anker v. G.D. Searle & Co., 126 F.R.D. 515, 519 (M.D. N.C. 1989).
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